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Han Dynasty

206 BCE - 220 CE

Sima Qian—author of an authoritative account for this period (Shiji / Records of the Grand Historian); helped establish a moral + interpretive framework for “who are we / who are others,” and a durable model for writing “official history.”

Xiongnu (nomadic/steppe confederations to the north; a recurring “other” in Han historical writing and frontier policy)

Han matters because it institutionalized the imperial system: Qin gets credit for creating the first centralized empire; Han gets credit for making that system durable (nearly 400 years) and culturally legitimate (e.g., “Han Chinese” as a later identity label).

Han as a process: a changing political and cultural entity whose ruling ideology and institutions evolved over time:

  • Confucian Ideology (legitimacy, education, moral language)
  • Legalist Administration (bureaucratic structure, law, provincial governance)
  • Daoist / “wuwei”-style Economic Recovery Policies (light-touch governance, letting households recover after Qin)

Former Han (Western Han)

  • 206 BCE - 9 CE (often grouped as part of “Former/Western Han”)
  • Period of remarkable stability: adult rulers, long reigns, limited succession crises
  • Han Wudi (r. 141–87 BCE): long reign; internal consolidation + major expansion (Vietnam, Korea, and westward openings associated with Silk Road routes); improved administration and revenue extraction that supported a modernized army and further expansion
  • Early structure looked more like Zhou-style kingdoms (emperor controls the capital region; relies on relatives to rule “kingdoms” elsewhere), but over time the court re-centralized: reduced/absorbed regional kingdoms and strengthened centrally appointed bureaucratic administration
  • “Confucianize” the Legalist administration (Confucian rhetoric + education paired with inherited Qin-era administrative machinery)
  • Economic recovery / restraint (reduce burdens, let people “recover and enjoy their harvest,” instead of extracting everything for the state)

Wang Mang Interregnum

9 - 23 CE

  • Usurpation by an in-law/affinal line of the imperial house (empress’s family)
  • Pushed radical reforms; short-lived and ultimately failed

Later Han (Eastern Han)

25 - 220 CE

  • Central power becomes less secure; increased problems of succession and factional conflict
  • Devolution of central power; local strongmen/warlords grow
  • Court politics becomes a battleground among elites (imperial relatives, officials, empress’s kin, and especially eunuchs/favorites), contributing to chronic instability

1) Confucian Ideology vs Legalist Institution

Sima Qian and the “moral reading” of Qin → Han

  • Confucian-leaning historians (with Sima Qian as a major voice) framed Qin’s fall and Han’s rise as a moral drama: virtuous rule vs harsh legalism.
  • Qin (and the First Emperor) were castigated for harsh law, extravagant public works, heavy taxation and labor burdens, and “persecution” of scholars/ideas.
  • But: moral judgment is only one lens. Historians are also products of their own time; a “history of the past” is often also a “contemporary history” shaped by current values and legitimacy needs.

Confucianism as state ideology, curriculum, and training

  • Han elevated Confucian scholars and increasingly used Confucianism as a legitimating technology for empire.
  • Dong Zhongshu (179–104 BCE; often dated ~175–105 BCE):
    • Developed 天人感应 (human–heaven resonance): natural events signal “heaven’s” satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the ruler.
    • A practical diagnostic for virtue in a system with no elections/approval ratings: disasters (earthquakes, droughts, etc.) could be read as political warnings, pressuring emperors toward “course correction.”
  • Han begins to formalize Confucianism as a curriculum:
    • Scholars collect/salvage “classics,” standardize teaching, and embed Confucian learning in the state’s cultural infrastructure.
    • National University (Taixue) established (traditionally 124/125 BCE): began with ~50 students and later grew to very large enrollments (reported as tens of thousands by late Western Han), functioning like an official-training pipeline.

Legalist structure remains (in practice)

  • Even while “legalism” was ideologically repudiated, legalist institutions remained powerful:
    • many Qin-derived structures persist (provincial administration, bureaucratic routines, centrally appointed officials)
    • punishments and burdens are moderated, but the state’s administrative skeleton stays intact
  • Resulting “contradiction” is real: Confucian scholars shape education/legitimacy while Legalist-style administrators run day-to-day governance.

2) Autocratic Rule vs Bureaucratic Administration

Recurring problem: how can an emperor rule a huge territory—secure support, extract resources, and recruit capable officials?

  • Long-term social shift (already visible in Warring States): decline of hereditary aristocracy + rise of meritocratic rhetoric, but the tension returns repeatedly.
  • “Great families” (powerful local lineages) persist and can monopolize office:
    • sources: imperial household relatives; eminent officials/bureaucrats; generals with military power and land/clients; wealthy elites with cultural capital
    • networks + wealth create barriers to upward mobility (information + education costs)

Personnel selection

  • Recommendation system (preferred/typical): court calls on elite networks to nominate “talented men,” sometimes for specific posts.
  • Early examinations:
    • historical records mention written tests for candidates (often dated to 165 BCE) as an early “seed” of the later exam system.
    • still unequal in practice (access to information and preparation favors elites).
  • National University as training pipeline (see above).
  • Confucian skepticism about “objective testing” mattered:
    • virtue/talent seen as hard to quantify; reputation and recommendation remain central for much of Han.

3) War vs Diplomacy

Han’s external relations—especially with steppe nomads—shaped imperial policy and long-term cultural imagination.

Inner Asian Frontier as cultural + racial boundary

  • The “frontier” becomes a conceptual line: where “civilization ends” and “barbarians” begin.
  • Han historical writing helped produce a stereotyped image of dangerous, exotic “others,” which in turn clarified (by opposition) what counted as “Chinese way of life.”
  • Important caveat: Xiongnu left few written records; much of what we “know” comes through Han (enemy) sources.

Steppe environment and nomadic lifeways (why horses matter)

  • Regions: largely treeless grasslands from Manchuria through Mongolia toward Xinjiang/Central Asia
  • Extreme temperatures, low rainfall → pastoralism better than settled agriculture:
    • animal husbandry; herding sheep/goats/camels/horses; seasonal migration
    • kinship-based organization (clans/tribes), sometimes forming loose federations under powerful leaders

Han policy toward the Xiongnu

  • Two broad strategies recur:
    • Appeasement / heqin (marriage diplomacy): sending princesses/women connected to the imperial house, plus gifts/tribute, to stabilize relations when Han is weaker or internally focused
    • Aggressive warfare after consolidation: decade-long campaigns to reassert dominance and reshape frontier security, especially under strong reigns like Han Wudi
  • Frontier interaction has durable effects on:
    • military strategy and material culture (horses as a key military resource)
    • foreign policy repertoires (appeasement vs force)
    • national psyche / popular narratives about strength vs “enemies” (frontier tropes persist long after Han)

Wrap-up / significance

  • Han’s big achievement: making the imperial system work (durability, institutionalization, legitimacy), while expanding and standardizing governance.
  • Han’s decline: interacting crises—weak central government, elite factionalism, empowered regional forces—culminating in rebellions, warlord intervention, and entry into a long period of fragmentation/chaos after 220 CE.